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The deontic logic DUS is a Deontic update 
semantics for prescriptive obligations based on 
the update semantics of Veltman. In ous the 
definition of logical validity of obligations is not 
based on static truth values but on dynamic action 
transitions. In this paper prescriptive defeasible 
obligations are formalized in update semantics 
and the diagnostic problem of defeasible deon­
tic logic is discussed. Assume a defeasible obli­
gation 'normally a ought to be (done)' together 
with the fact '-,a is (done).' Is this an exception 
of the normality claim, or is it a violation of the 
obligation? In this paper we formalize the heuris­
tic principle that it is a violation, unless there is 
a more specific overriding obligation. The un­
derlying motivation from legal reasoning is that 
criminals should have as little opportunities as 
possible to excuse themselves by claiming that 
their behavior was exceptional rather than crimi­
nal. 
1 THE LOGIC OF NORMS 
Computer scientists use the logic of obligations, prohibi­
tions and permissions - called deontic logic - since the 
early eighties to represent and reason with legal knowledge 
(McCarty, 1994), and recently it has been used to spec­
ify and analyze security issues about electronic networks 
(Conte and Falcone, 1997), to represent norms in qualita­
tive decision theory (Pearl, 1993; Boutilier, 1994; Lang, 
1996) and to represent rights, duties and commitments in 
multi-agent systems (van der Torre and Tan, 1999b). A fur­
ther increase may be expected now recently developed pre­
scriptive deontic logics (Makinson, 1999; van der Torre and 
Tan, 1998a) have delivered some promising approaches for 
the following long-standing problems in normative reason­
ing and their notorious deontic paradoxes. 
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Contrary-to-duty. The conceptual issue of the contrary­
to-duty paradoxes is how to proceed once a norm has 
been violated. Clearly this issue is of great practical 
relevance, because in most applications norms are vi­
olated frequently. In electronic contracting the con­
tracting parties usually do not want to consider a vi­
olation as a breach of contract, but simply as a dis­
ruption in the execution of the contract that has to be 
repaired. 
Dilemma. The conceptual problem of the dilemma para­
doxes is to determine the coherence conditions of a 
normative system. For example, when drafting regu­
lations a coherence check indicates whether they have 
this desired property, or whether they should be fur­
ther modified. 
In this paper we introduce a deontic update semantics for 
defeasible obligations and we show that the dynamic ap­
proach not only gives a better analysis of the traditional 
deontic problems, but it also gives a better analysis of the 
problems discussed in defeasible deontic logic. An exam­
ple of reasoning with defeasible obligations is that nor­
mally you have an obligation not to have a fence around 
your cottage, but this obligation is defeated in the excep­
tional circumstances when your cottage is next to a cliff 
(the examples in this paper are taken from the cottage hous­
ing regulations discussed in (Prakken and Sergo!, 1996)). 
Defeasible obligations can be overridden or cancelled by 
other, stronger obligations. It has been argued that more 
specific defeasible obligations are stronger than more gen­
eral defeasible obligations, and therefore override them in 
case of conflict (Horty, 1993; van der Torre, 1994; Asher 
and Bonevac, 1996; Morreau, 1996). Unfortunately, the 
analysis of the specificity principle in logics of defeasible 
reasoning does not apply to defeasible deontic logic, be­
cause it may interfere with the violability of norms. In 
other words, the combination of reasoning about uncer­
tainty and contrary-to-duty reasoning leads to new com­
plications. This interference is illustrated by the following 
diagnostic problem. 
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1. There should not be a fence around the cottage. 
2. If the cottage is next to a cliff, then there should be a 
white fence. 
3. If there is a fence, tlien it should be white. 
4. There is a white fence. 
Is the fact 'there is a white fence' a violation or an ex­
ception? Obviously, this is a crucial question for legal 
knowledge-based systems. If the cottage is next to a cliff, 
then there should be a white fence according to the second 
line and the first obligation is cancelled. Moreover, if there 
is a fence, then there should be a white fence according to 
the third line, but the first obligation is not cancelled. 
In this paper we formalize the heuristic principle that a 
defeasible obligation 'normally a ought to be (done)' to­
gether with the fact '•a is (done)' is a violation, unless 
there is a more specific overriding obligation. The underly­
ing motivation from legal reasoning is that criminals should 
have as little opportunities as possible to excuse themselves 
by claiming that their behavior was exceptional rather than 
criminal. In absence of a cliff you have to pay a penalty for 
having a fence, because in that case the first obligation is a 
violated actual obligation. The difference between the an­
tecedent of the second and third obligation is represented in 
the deontic states of the update semantics by two different 
orderings: the second gives rise to levels of exceptional­
ity (inspired by preference-based approaches to defeasible 
reasoning) and the third gives rise to levels of ideality (in­
spired by preference-based approaches to deontic reason­
ing). Summarizing, if there is a fence without a cliff, then 
the first obligation is overshadowed (by the third obliga­
tion) but not cancelled (by the second obligation). it is still 
in force - thus it is violated. 
The defeasible obligations discussed in this paper should 
not be confused with prima facie obligations (Ross, 1930; 
Asher and Bonevac, 1996; Morreau, 1996; van der Torre 
and Tan, 1998b). The typical example of prima facie obli· 
gations is that you have a prima facie obligation to keep 
your promises, but this prima facie obligation does not turn 
into an actual obligation when it leads to a disaster. The dis­
tinctive property is that the obligation 'there ought not to be 
a fence' is completely cancelled if your cottage is next to a 
cliff. However, if you have to break a promise to prevent a 
disaster, then the obligation to hold promises still holds as 
a prima facie obligation. Consequently, prima facie obliga­
tions have properties defeasible obligations considered in 
this paper do not have, such as reinstatement (van der Torre 
and Tan, 1997). 
The layout of this paper is as follows. First, we intro­
duce prescriptive defeasible obligations in update seman­
tics. Second, we show that the logic formalizes the speci­
ficity principle without introducing an irrelevance problem. 
Third, we show how test operators can be introduced in 
the logic. Due to space limitations we do not discuss per­
missions, a first -order base language, nested conditionals, 
background knowledge, authorities, agents, actions, and 
time. In the context of deontic update semantics some 
of these have been discussed in (van der Torre and Tan, 
1999b). 
2 DEFEASIBLE OBLIGATIONS INDUS 
In this section we define prescriptive defeasible obligations 
in update semantics. The logic handles conflicts of hier­
archic obligations, which normally exist, but might be dy­
namically re-evaluated. Two characteristic properties of the 
logic are that obligations are overridden by more specific 
and conflicting obligations, and that unresolvable strong 
conflicts like 'p ought to be (done) and •p ought to be 
(done)' are 'inconsistent' in the sense that they derive all 
sentences of the deontic language. 
We start with the basic definitions of Veltman's update se­
mantics (Veltman, 1996). To define a deontic update se­
mantics for a deontic language L, one has to specify a set E 
of relevant deontic states (called information states in (Velt­
man, 1996)), and a function [] that assigns to each sentence 
¢ an operation (¢] on E. If u is a state and ¢ a sentence, 
then we write 'u(¢]' to denote the result of updating u with 
¢. We can write 'u(¢1] ... [1/>n]' for the result of updating 
u with the sequence of sentences 1/>1, ... , 1/>n. Moreover, 
one of the deontic states has to be labeled as the minimal 
deontic state, written as 0, and another one as the absurd 
state, written as 1. 
Definition 1 (Deontic update system) A deontic update 
system is a triple (L, E, [ ]) consisting of a logical lan­
guage L, a set of relevant deontic states E and a function 
[ ] that assigns to each sentence ¢ of L an operation. E 
contains the elements 0 and 1. 
Veltman explains what kind of semantic phenomena may 
successfully be analyzed in update semantics and he gives 
a detailed analysis of one such phenomenon: default rea­
soning. To define obligations in update semantics we have 
to define the deontic language, the deontic states and the 
deontic updates. The deontic language is a propositional 
language with the dyadic operator oblige( a I !3), read as 
'normally a ought to be (done), if /3 is (done).' 
Definition 2 (Deontic language) Let A be a set of atoms 
and L� a propositional language with A as its non-logical 
symbols. A string of symbols ¢ is a sentence of Lf if and 
only if either ¢ is a sentence of L� or there are two sen­
tences 1/JJ and 'lj;2 of L� such that¢= oblige(1/JJI1/J2). We 
write oblige 'lj; for oblige( 'lj; IT), where T stands for any 
tautology. 
A deontic state is a possible worlds model written as u = 
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(W, ::;I, ::;;N, V), where W is a set of worlds, �I is an ac­
cessibility relation for ideality, �N is an accessibility rela­
tion for normality, and V a valuation function for proposi­
tions at the worlds. For propositional¢ and world w E W 
we write rT, w f= <P if the classical interpretation repre­
sented by V ( w) satisfies ¢. We add the following features 
to these deontic states. 
Explicit sub-state. We extend the possible worlds model 
with a second deontic state, which is a sub-state of the 
first one. The complete state is used for the context of 
justification and the sub-state is used for the context 
of deliberation, see (van der Torre and Tan, 1998a). 
W hereas in Kripke semantics a unique world is sin­
gled out, called the actual world, we single out a set of 
worlds, called the context of deliberation. 
Full models. We define an update system for a specific A, 
W and V. In this paper, we assume that the deontic 
state contains a world for each interpretation of L� . If 
we want to represent background knowledge, then this 
assumption has to be dropped (van der Torre, 1994; 
Lang, 1996). 
Non-transitive ideality relation. We assume that the bi­
nary ideality relation is reflexive, but we do not as­
sume that it is transitive or total. There is a tech­
nical problem related to the formalization of condi­
tional obligations, discussed in (van der Torre and Tan, 
1998a). A consequence of this problem is that we 
cannot have transitivity for the relations in the dean­
tic states. We take the transitive closure of this re­
lation only when we determine the preferred worlds. 
In (van der Torre and Tan, 1998a) we showed that a de­
antic state can be interpreted as a set of orderings, one 
for each factual sentence, instead of a unique ordering. 
However, this technical problem is not relevant for the 
intuitions of our deontic update system and the inter­
pretation of most examples, and the deontic state can 
usually be identified with a single transitive ordering. 
Definition 3 (Deontic state) Let Lf be a deontic lan­
guage. Assume a set of worlds W and a valuation function 
V for L� such that for every interpretation of L� there 
is at least one corresponding w E W. A deontic state is 
a tuple rT = (W, W*, �I, �N, V) consisting of the set of 
worlds W, a possibly empty subset w• <; W, a reflexive 
binary relation �I on W representing ideality, a transi­
tive, reflexive and totally connected binary relation �N on 
W representing normality, and the valuation function V. 
0, the minimal state, is (W, W, W x W, W x W, V), 
1, the absurd state, is (W, 0, W x W, W x W, V). 
The deontic updates are operations on the deontic states 
that either zoom in on the deontic state (for facts), or ere-
ate ideality and normality levels (for obligations). The pre­
scriptive obligations have the dynamic component of creat­
ing a new deontic state. We first define the reduction of the 
ideality relation by an obligation. The following two def­
initions are extensions of definitions of the non-defeasible 
case in (van der Torre and Tan, 1998a). In that case, to 
evaluate 'a ought to be (done) if /3 is (done)' the a A /3 and 
-,a II /3 worlds are compared. In a defeasible deontic logic, 
to evaluate the obligation 'normally, a ought to be (done) if 
/3 is (done),' only the most normal a A /3 and the most nor­
mal -,a A /3 worlds are compared in the ideality relation. 
To facilitate the definitions we assume that the normality 
ordering has minimal elements; the generalization to infi­
nite descending chains is standard and straight forward (see 
e.g. (van der Torre and Tan, 1997)). 
Definition 4 (Reduction) Let CT = (W, w·, �I, �N, V) 
be a deontic state, and let W1 and W2 be the set of respec­
tively the most normal..,a II /3 and a A /3 worlds ofW. The 
reduction ofrT by oblige(al/3), denoted by the symbol-, is 
defined as follows. 
��=�I -{wl � w21 Wt E wl andw2 E W2} 
rT- oblige(al/3) = (W, w·, ��. �N, V) 
In the non-defeasible logic, the update rT[oblige(a I /3)] 
is the reduction of rT by oblige( a I /3) if afterwards the 
best /3 worlds are a worlds. Otherwise there is a con­
flict. For this definition of deontic updates we need a test 
whether the best (or preferred, or minimal) /3 worlds are a 
worlds. This test is analogous to the satisfaction test of a 
dyadic obligation in the Hansson-Lewis semantics (Hans­
son, 1971; Lewis, 1974), and to the test whether a set of 
formulas preferentially entails a conclusion in preferential 
entailment (Shoham, 1988). In the defeasible deontic logic, 
we test whether the best most normal a A /3 worlds are bet­
ter than the best most normal ..,a A /3 worlds. Note that 
this test is different from 'the best of the most normal /3 
worlds are a worlds' (Makinson, 1993) or 'the most nor­
mal of the best worlds are a worlds' which have the coun­
terintuitive property 'what normally is (done) ought to be 
(done).' Definition 5 below combines the standard defini­
tion with taking the transitive closure, see (van der Torre 
and Tan, 1998a). 
Definition 5 (pref) Let CT = (W, W*, �I,� N, V) be a de­
antic state, let W1 and W2 be the set of the most normal 
-,a A /3 and a II /3 worlds of W, and let �!3 be the transi­
tive closure of �I in Wt U W2, i.e. the smallest superset of 
�I such that for all /3 -worlds Wt, W2, Wa E Wt u w2 with 
Wt �!3 w2 and w2 �!3 wa we have Wt �!3 wa. We write 
pref(rT, /3) =a if and only if for all worlds W1 E Wt there 
is a world w2 E W2 such that w2 :::;;!3 Wt and there is no 
W3 E W1 such that Wa �{3 W2. 
If there is a conflict, then we introduce another exceptional­
ity level. In this exceptional level, the previous distinction 
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in the ideality relation is repaired. 
Definition 6 (Exception) Let a = (W, W*, ::;I. ::;N, V) 
be a deontic state and let W1 and W2 stand for the most 
normal /3 and ..,13 worlds, respectively, and let W1,1 and 
W1 ,2 stand for the partition of W1 in a II fJ and ..,a 11 fJ 
worlds. The introduction of an exceptionality level in a by 
oblige(al/3), denoted by the symbol-N, is defined as fol­
lows. 
::;�=::;/ +{wi::; w2l WI E W1,1 andw2 E W1,2} 
::;�=::;N -{ WJ ::; w2 I WI E W1 and w2 E W2} 
a-N oblige(al/3) = (W, w·, ::;� , ::;� , V) 
Putting it all together we define the updates. The gen­
eral principle is that in case of conflict when updating with 
oblige( alfJ) a new exceptionality level for fJ is introduced. 
Finally, Von Wright's contingency principle, i.e. the obli­
gation 'a ought to be (done) if /3 is (done)' implies the con­
sistency of a II /3 and -,a II /3, is formalized by a test on the 
existence cf a II fJ and -,a II fJ worlds. 
Definition 7 (Updates) Let a = (W, W*, ::;1, ::;N, V) be 
a deontic state. The update function a[c;i>] is defined as fol­
lows. 
• if c;l> is a factual sentence of L� , then 
- ifW' = {w E W* I a, w f= ¢} f. 0, then 
a[¢]= (W, W', ::;1, ::;N, V); 
- otherwise, a[c;i>] = 1. 
• ifc;l> = oblige( al/3), then 
- if a f. 1 and there are WI, w2 E W such that 
a, WI f= -,a II /3 and a, w2 f= a II /3, then 
* ifpref(a- oblige(al/3), /3) =a then a[¢] = 
a- oblige(al/3) 
* otherwise 
if pref(a - N oblige(al/3)-
oblige(al/3), /3) = a  then a[¢] 
a-N oblige(al/3) - oblige(al/3) 
otherwise, a[¢] = 1 
- otherwise, a[¢] = 1. 
A crucial notion of update systems is acceptance. The for­
mula c;l> is accepted in a deontic state a, written as a II-¢, 
if the update by c;1> results in the same state. In that case, 
the information conveyed by ¢ is already subsumed by a. 
Acceptance is the counterpart of satisfaction in standard se­
mantics. 
Definition 8 (Acceptance) Let a be a deontic state and¢ 
a formula of the deontic language Lf . a II- ¢ if and only if 
a[c;i>] =a. 
If an update is accepted, then the deontic state usually has 
a specific content. For example, it is easily checked that a 
fact a is accepted if all the worlds of W* f. 0 satisfy a, or 
a= 1. 
The notion of acceptance is used to define notions of valid­
ity. An argument is I h valid if updating the minimal state 0 
with the premises t/!I, . . . , t/Jn, in that order, yields a deontic 
state in which the conclusion is accepted, and an argument 
is I f-. valid if all deontic states constructed by updating 
the minimal state 0 with the premises t/J1, . . .  , t/Jn in some 
order such that the premises are accepted, also accept the 
conclusion (van der Torre and Tan, 1998b). Note that the 
order of the premises is only relevant for lh, not for I f-. . 
Definition 9 (Validity) Let t/JJ. . . .  , t/Jn and c;1> be sentences 
of the deontic language Lf. The argument of¢ from the 
premises tPI , ... , tPn is valid, written as tPI , ... , t/Jn 11-1 ¢, 
if and only if O[tf;I] ... [t/Jn]ll- c;l>. The argument of c;l> from 
the premises tPI, ... , tPn is nonmonotonically valid, written 
as tPI, ... , tPn I f-. c;i>, if and only if for all permutations 1r of 
1 . . .  n such that t/J,(I)• ... , t/J,(n) ll-1 tf;; for 1 ::; i ::; n we 
have t/J,(!), ... , t/J,(n) ll-1 c;l>. 
It is clear that checking entailment for all possible orders 
in which the obligations are taken into account leads to a 
factorial number of entailment problems. The complexity 
of the inference is therefor very high. 
Below some simple examples of the validity relation are 
given that do not create exceptionality levels, see (van der 
Torre and Tan, 1998a ). 
oblige(piT) If-- oblige(plq) 
oblige(plr), oblige(qlr) If-- oblige(p II qlr) 
oblige(plqllr), oblige(qlr) If-- oblige(pllqlr) 
oblige(piT) llfoblige(pv qiT) 
oblige(plq), oblige(plr) I If oblige(plq v r) 
In the following section we illustrate that one of the fea­
tures of I f-. is that more specific and conflicting obliga­
tions are only accepted if they are later than more general 
ones. Hence, more specific and conflicting obligations cre­
ate exceptionality levels and override more general ones. 
Moreover, we also illustrate how the logic deals with the 
diagnostic problem. 
3 EXAMPLE 
Consider the two obligations from the cottage housing reg­
ulations oblige( -,fiT) and oblige(flc), where f stands for 
a fence around the cottage and c for a cliff next to the cot­
tage. We first consider the situation in which the most spe­
cific obligation comes first. The ideality relation is repre­
sented in Figure 1. The corners are labelled with true atoms 
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representing a world. For readability only positive atoms 
are represented. We only represent the ideality relation, be­
cause if the more specific obligation comes first then all 
worlds remain equivalent in the normality ordering. 
ideality oblige(f I c) oblige -,f 
nxt! n5<t1 nx(l 
c � c,f c - c,f c c,f 
Figure 1: Fence: most specific obligation first 
Otherwise, the more general obligation comes before the 
more specific one, as illustrated in Figure 2 below. Note 
that in the third ideality relation the arrows from c 1\ .,f 
to c 1\ f are restored, because the c worlds have become 
exceptional. 
ideality oblige .,f oblige(f I c) 
(!Xll f!Xt! nX(! 
c == c,f c - c,f c - c,f 
normality 
(!Xll 
c == c,f 
Figure 2: Fence: most general obligation first 
The only accepted order of the premises in Definition 9 
is that the more general obligation comes before the more 
specific one, because only in that case the premises are ac­
cepted. 
oblige(fic), oblige( ..,fiT) lh oblige( ..,fiT) 
oblige(flc), oblige( .... fiT) lf'1 oblige(! Ic) 
oblige( ...  fiT), oblige(fjc) lf-1 oblige( ...,fiT) 
oblige( -,fiT), oblige (fie) lf-1 oblige(fjc) 
The second deontic state in Figure 2 accepts the obligation 
oblige( .,f I c) , but the third does not. Consequently we 
have the following. 
oblige(-.fiT) If-- oblige(...,flc) 
oblige(-.fiT), oblige(fjc) I bt oblige( ...  fie) 
Hence, the logic formalizes the specificity principle. More­
over, the logic does not have an irrelevance problem, be­
cause we have for example that there ought to be no fence 
in the weekend (w). 
oblige(...,fiT), oblige(fjc) If-- oblige(...,flw) 
It is easily checked that the same results are obtained if 
we adopt the first two formulas of the example in the in­
troduction, i.e. oblige(...,JIT) and oblige(w 1\ fie) where 
w 1\ f stands for a white fence. This is a consequence of the 
fact that we use tests on minimal worlds by testing whether 
pref(u, (J) = a. The difference is the constructed ideality 
relation of c worlds. 
oblige( .,fiT) If-- oblige( -.fie) 
oblige(...,fiT), oblige(w A fie) lffoblige(-.flc) 
Finally, we consider the diagnostic problem by taking the 
third (and contrary-to-duty) oblige(w 1\ fif) into account. 
The only orders that accept all premises are again orders in 
which the second obligation is later than the first obligation, 
which leads to the following three orders. 
oblige(w A !If), oblige(-.fiT), oblige(fjc) 
oblige(...,fiT), oblige(w A !If), oblige(fjc) 
oblige(...,fiT), oblige(fjc), oblige(w A !If) 
The first two orders lead to a deontic state in which all wl\f 
worlds are preferred to ...,w 1\ f worlds, whereas the latter 
order leads to a state in which only the ...,c 1\ w 1\ f worlds 
are preferred to ...,c 1\ .,w 1\ f worlds. The latter order is 
represented in Figure 3. In the figure we do not represent 
f 1\ ...,w worlds, because they are meaningless (they could be 
deleted from the model by using background knowledge, 
see (van der Torre, 1994; Lang, 1996)). Moreover, with 
(w) we represent that w can either be true or false. 
ideality 
n� 
c - c,f(w) 
normality 
·1xr) 
c � c,f(w) 
Figure 3: Fence with contrary-to-duty 
Figure 3 illustrates how the deontic update semantics for 
defeasible obligations deals with the diagnostic problem. 
As explained in (van der Torre and Tan, 1998b ), to deal 
with the diagnostic problem we have to distinguish be-
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tween decision variables and parameters or events (Lang, 
1996) (called controllable and uncontrollable propositions 
in (Boutilier, 1994) ). We therefor call c a parameter and 
w and f decision variables. There is a violation of a duty 
proper if and only if for every world that still can be real­
ized and that is most normal there is a better world which 
can no longer be realized and which is as least as normal, 
and that has the same truth values for the parameters. 
First, consider the most normal w 1\ f state, i.e. •c 1\ w 1\ f. 
Though this state is not the worst state (this is -.c/\ ..,w/\f), 
it is clear that this state is a violation state. The •c 1\ -,j 
state is preferred to it, it is as normal, and it has the same 
truth values for the parameter c. Moreover, consider c 1\ f. 
The only world that has the same values for the parameters 
is c 1\ -,j, but these worlds are worse. Consequently c 1\ f 
is not a violation. 
If we replace the second obligation by oblige(w 1\ f I c), 
then the same argument goes through. However, now the 
ideality order of the c worlds is identical for each order of 
the premises below: c 1\ w 1\ f is preferred to c 1\ -,j, which 
is preferred to c 1\ -,w 1\ f. 
oblige(w 1\ !If), oblige(...,f/T), oblige(w 1\ fie) 
oblige(•fiT), oblige(w 1\ flf), oblige(w 1\ fie) 
oblige(-,fiT), oblige(w 1\ fie), oblige(w 1\ !If) 
Summarizing, in the semantics different orderings are in­
troduced to distinguish violations and exceptions. They 
correspond to so-called factual and overridden defeasibil­
ity (van der Torre and Tan, 1997). Several other cases of 
apparent dilemmas of defeasible obligations can be solved 
by analyzing them as different types of defeasibility. Ex­
amples of conflict defeasibility are 'be polite' and 'be hon­
est' ({oblige p, oblige h}), and 'the window ought to be 
closed if it rains' and 'it ought to be open if the sun shines' 
( { oblige(c/r), oblige( -,cis)}). Examples of factual defea­
sibility are the contrary-to-duty paradoxes, such as 'Smith 
should not kill Jones,' 'if Smith kills Jones, then he should 
do it gently' and 'Smith kills Jones' 
{oblige -,k, oblige(g/k), k} 
given that gentle killing implies killing (I- g -t k), and' a 
certain man should go to the assistance of his neighbors,' 
'if the man goes to their assistance, then he should tell them 
that he will come,' 'if the man does not go to the assistance, 
then he should not tell them he will come' and 'the man 
does not go' 
{oblige a, oblige(tia), oblige( -,ti..,a), •a} 
In the following section we consider the latter example in 
the deontic update semantics extended with test operators. 
4 TEST OPERATORS 
In this section we formalize test operators in the dean­
tic update semantics. We write ideal( a I /3) for the test 
'ideally, a is (done), if f3 is (done).' The interaction be­
tween oblige and ideal is analogous to the interaction be­
tween normally and presumably operators in Veltman's 
update semantics (Veltman, 1996). The prescriptive obli­
gations oblige( a I /3) have the dynamic component of cre­
ating a new deontic state, whereas the tests evaluate what 
the norms are in a particular deontic state. The reason to 
introduce this new operator is that the ideal operator has 
weakening of the consequent and the disjunction rule for 
the antecedent. In Section 2 we showed that the prima facie 
obligations do not have weakening of the consequent, but 
they do have (restricted) strengthening of the antecedent. It 
is shown in (Tan and van der Torre, 1996) that we have to 
introduce a separate operator for weakening of the conse­
quent to combine these two intuitive inference patterns. For 
example, if the obligations oblige( ai/3) also have weaken­
ing of the consequent, then the counterintuitive obligation 
oblige(-,(w 1\ !)If) can be derived from oblige(-,f/T) by 
respectively weakening of the consequent and strengthen­
ing of the antecedent, regardless of the existence of another 
premise oblige(w 1\ f I f). The deontic language Lf is 
extended with the two dyadic operators ideal (a I /3) and 
ideal* (a l/3). 
Definition 10 (Deontic language, continued) Let A, Lf; 
and Lf be as defined in Definition 2. A string of symbols 
</J is a sentence of Lt if and only if either <P is a sentence 
of Lf or there are two sentences 1/J1, 1/J2 of Lf; such that 
either rjJ = ideai(1/Jti1/J2) or rjJ = ideai*(1/Jti1/J2). We write 
ideal'lj; for ideal('l/J/T) and ideal*'lj; for ideal*('l/JIT). 
For the dynamic interpretation of a test we define it anal­
ogously to the test operator in dynamic logic, and to the 
might and presumably operators in Veltman's update se­
mantics (Veltman, 1996). If the test is successful then the 
information conveyed by the test is already subsumed by 
the deontic state and the test update simply returns the state. 
Otherwise the test update returns the absurd state. 
Definition 11 (Deontic updates, continued) Let u = 
(W, w·' SI' SN' V) be a deontic state, and let pref be 
defined as pref, but with the worlds restricted to W* in­
stead of W. The update function u[¢] defined in Defini­
tion 7 is extended as follows. 
• ifrjJ = ideal(ai/3), then 
- if pref(u, /3) = a, then u[¢] = u; otherwise, 
u[¢] = 1. 
• ifrjJ = ideal* ( al/3), then 
- 1[pref(u,f3) =a, then u[¢] = u; otherwise, 
u[rf>] = 1. 
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The following contrary-to-duty paradox called Chisholm's 
paradox (Chisholm, 1963) illustrates how the two opera­
tors oblige and ideal are combined, and a fortiori how the 
two inference patterns strengthening of the antecedent and 
weakening of the consequent are combined. The contrary­
to-duty paradoxes are important benchmark problems of 
deontic logic. The examples also illustrate that the dean­
tic contrary-to-duty paradoxes can be modeled without any 
problems in DUS, and that the dynamic representation is in 
some respects more insightful than the static one. 
Consider the sentences 'a certain man should go to the as­
sistance of his neighbors' (oblige a), 'if the man goes to 
their assistance, then he should tell them that he will come' 
(oblige(t I a)), 'if the man does not go to the assistance, 
then he should not tell them he will come (oblige(-.ti".,a)) 
and 'the man does not go' (-.,a). Regardless of the order­
ing of the premises, the ideality relation in Figure 4 results. 
There are no conflicts and therefor no exceptionality levels 
are introduced. All worlds are equivalent in the normality 
ordering. 
[oblige a[ [oblige (t I a)[ [oblige (lt [la)[ [131 
:a� ...... _:cx) ........ :� )lo- :(5.0.0{): )lo- :''::·-,:� : T :..........-:a la: ......- :a.t a:lt la: : a.t a.lt la1tla.l: : · .. · ... · : 
'----
--------- ·------------' -----------------· 
·----------------· Figure 4: Chisholm's paradox 
In the context of justification (W) we have that in the ideal 
state the man tells his neighbors (t), 
oblige a, oblige(tla), oblige(-.,tl-.,a), -.,a If- ideal t 
and in the context of deliberation (W* ) we have that in the 
ideal state the man does not tell his neighbors (-.,t). 
oblige a, oblige(tla), oblige( -.,tl-.,a), -.,a If- ideal* -.,t 
We finally show how strengthening of the antecedent and 
weakening of the consequent are combined. Strengthening 
of the antecedent is a property of oblige and weakening of 
the consequent is a property of ideal. We have: 
oblige a, oblige(tla), oblige(-.,tl-.,a), -.,a If- oblige( a At) 
oblige a, oblige(tja), oblige(-.,tl-.,a), ...,a 1,1' oblige t 
oblige a, oblige(tla), oblige( -.,tl-.,a), ...,a If- ideal(a At) 
oblige a, oblige(tla), oblige(-.,tl...,a), -.,a If- ideal t 
The conclusion ideal tis derived from ideal(a At), which 
is derived from oblige( a At). See (Tan and van der Torre, 
1996) for a further discussion on these two phases of dean­
tic reasoning. 
5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The dynamic approach to formalizing norms (van der Torre 
and Tan, 1998a) follows a recent trend in dynamic seman­
tics (van Benthem, 1996). In this paper it has been extended 
by a logic of prescriptive defeasible obligations, in which 
more specific obligations override more general ones. The 
specificity problem is solved by making more specific obli­
gations refer to exceptional circumstances. 
Most of the deontic paradoxes concern obligations, and 
therefore most of the paradox driven research in deontic 
logic has focussed on obligations. However, in some appli­
cations - e.g. computer security - rights and permissions 
play a dominant role. In 'standard' approaches permission 
is defined as the absence of obligation. However, there 
are at least the following two problems with this so-called 
'weak' permission. 
Free choice. The conceptual problem of the free choice 
paradoxes is whether a permission for a disjunctive 
sentence implies the permission of each of its dis­
juncts (von W right, 1968; Kamp, 7374). This property 
cannot be accepted for weak permissions, and there­
fore new free choice operators have been defined. 
Strong pennission. A so-called 'strong' permission - the 
existence of an explicitly permitting norm- does not 
follow from the absence of an obligation, because an 
act or state can be neither obligatory nor explicitly per­
mitted. Thus it cannot be defined as weak permission, 
and again new operators have been defined. 
Strong permissions have been defined in (van der Torre and 
Tan, 1999b ). These operators can be restricted to the most 
normal worlds, and then they can be used in the update 
semantics proposed in this paper. 
In the update semantics for prima facie obligations (van der 
Torre and Tan, 1998b) a value (its strength) is associated 
with prima facie obligations (Ross, 1930), such that they 
can override weaker obligations (van der Torre and Tan, 
1997). They are represented by deontic states where the 
ideality relation is replaced by a ranking function on or­
dered pairs of worlds, i.e. by (W, R, V), where R is a rank­
ing function from W x W to the set of values. It is an open 
question how the two types of overridden defeasibility can 
be combined in deontic states that have a ranking function 
as well as a normality relation (W, W* , R1, 5,N, V). 
It is well known that defeasible deontic logic is related 
to logics for qualitative decision theory (Pearl, 1993; 
Boutilier, 1994; van der Torre and Tan, 1999a). In partic­
ular, prima facie obligations are related to logics of desires 
(qualitative abstractions of utilities) which can be overrid­
den by stronger desires (Tan and Pearl, 1994; Lang, 1996). 
The formal relation between obligations and desires is sub­
ject of present investigations. 
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